Virtual Networks under Attack: Disrupting Internet Coordinate Systems by Kaafar, Mohamed Ali et al.
HAL Id: inria-00085296
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00085296
Submitted on 15 Jul 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Virtual Networks under Attack: Disrupting Internet
Coordinate Systems
Mohamed Ali Kaafar, Laurent Mathy, Thierry Turletti, Walid Dabbous
To cite this version:
Mohamed Ali Kaafar, Laurent Mathy, Thierry Turletti, Walid Dabbous. Virtual Networks under
Attack: Disrupting Internet Coordinate Systems. [Research Report] 2006, pp.11. ￿inria-00085296￿
Virtual Networks under Attack:
Disrupting Internet Coordinate Systems
Mohamed Ali Kaafar
INRIA Sophia Antipolis
mohamed.kaafar@sophia.inria.fr
Laurent Mathy
Computing Department
Lancaster University
laurent@comp.lancs.ac.uk
Thierry Turletti , Walid Dabbous
INRIA Sophia Antipolis
{turletti,dabbous}@sophia.inria.fr
ABSTRACT
The recently proposed coordinates-based systems for network po-
sitioning have been shown to be accurate, with very low distance
prediction error. However, these systems often rely on nodes coor-
dination and assume that information reported by probed nodes is
correct. In this paper, we identify different attacks against coordi-
nates embedding systems and study the impact of such attacks on
two recently proposed representative positioning systems, namely
Vivaldi and NPS. Such attacks can seriously disrupt the operations
of the coordinate systems and therefore the virtual networks and
applications relying on them for distance measurements.
We present a simulation study of attacks carried out by malicious
nodes that provide biased coordinates information and delay mea-
surement probes. We experiment with attack strategies that aim to
(i) introduce disorder in the system, (ii) fool honest nodes to move
far away from their correct positions and (iii) isolate particular tar-
get nodes in the system through collusion. Our findings confirm the
susceptibility of the coordinate systems to such attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen the proliferation of application-level over-
lays (or overlays in short) to support many different types of ap-
plications ranging from file sharing to VoIP (e.g. [1] [2] [3] [4],
etc). To achieve network topology-awareness, most, if not all, of
these overlays rely on the notion of proximity, usually defined in
terms of network delays or round-trip times (RTTs), for optimal
neighbour selection during overlay construction and maintenance.
Despite efforts to keep proximity measurements to a minimum on
many overlays, the simultaneous presence of several overlays can
result in significant bandwidth consumption by proximity measure-
ments (i.e. ping storms) carried out by individual overlay nodes [5].
This problem is also compounded by dynamics in overlay member-
ship, as measuring and tracking proximity within a rapidly chang-
ing group can prove very onerous.
To avoid such overhead, the idea of distance estimation and net-
work positioning/coordinate systems were introduced. In such sys-
tems, the thesis is that if each node can be associated with a “vir-
tual” coordinate in an appropriate space, distance between nodes
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can be trivially computed without direct measurement. In other
words, as long as a reasonably accurate position for a node can be
obtained with little effort, much of the distance measurement sam-
pling cost can be eliminated and the remaining overhead amortized
over many distance predictions.
Most of the recently proposed coordinates-based systems have
been shown to be accurate, achieving very low prediction error. On
the other hand, a robust, stable, scalable and low overhead coordi-
nate system can often only be realized at the expense of slow con-
vergence times. In such a scheme, new nodes joining the system
only reach a good estimate of their own coordinates after a lapse of
time in the timescale of tens of seconds to several minutes. Such
convergence times, which are longer than those typically achieved
with individual sampling of distances by nodes, are often unaccept-
able for applications and this argues for a deployment of coordinate
systems as a service: every node could run a coordinate system
daemon at boot time which would then be capable of providing
accurate coordinate estimates to applications and their overlays on
request. In essence, the coordinate system could then be seen as a
component of a “virtual infrastructure” that supports a wide range
of overlays and applications.
But a system providing an “always-on and large scale coordinate
service” would also likely be a prime target for hackers, as its dis-
ruption could result in the mis-functioning or the collapse of very
many applications and overlays. Indeed, as the use of overlays and
applications relying on coordinates increases, one could imagine
the release of worms and other malicious software whose purpose
is to attack the coordinate system. It should also be noted that as
current proposals for coordinate systems assume that the nodes par-
taking in the system cooperate fully and honestly with each other
– that is that the information reported by probed nodes is correct –
this could also make them quite vulnerable to malicious attacks. In
particular, insider attacks executed by (potentially colluding) nodes
infiltrating the system could prove very effective. In this paper we
study just how potent this danger is for the Vivaldi and NPS coordi-
nate systems. We believe that understanding how to secure the base
of distance prediction for many applications is much more critical,
than detailing security of the artifacts of any particular application.
We identify three types of potential attacks against coordinate-
based network positioning systems. Specifically, we study how
these attacks can lead to inaccuracy of distance prediction. We an-
alyze simple ways that allow malicious nodes to take control of the
embedding coordinates system, as they are able to impose positions
in the network to other honest nodes, without being detected. We
also demonstrate that it is easy to perform Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks on such systems. Finally, we study how conspiracy can be
achieved in these systems and how much it could affect them. The
“effectiveness” of these attacks on the target systems are demon-
strated through extensive simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a brief overview of the embedding coordinates systems. In
section 3, we describe in more details the workings of the systems
chosen for this study. We identify and classify the attacks in Sec-
tion 4. We demonstrate and study the effects of theses attacks,
through extensive simulations, in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a brief survey of recently proposed sys-
tems for computing coordinates to network positioning.
2.1 Fixed Landmark-based coordinate systems
These systems involve a set of landmark nodes, where other
nodes compute coordinates according to measurements to these
landmarks.
In Global Network Positioning (GNP) [6], the coordinates of the
landmarks are first computed by minimizing the error between the
measured distances and the estimated distances among the land-
mark nodes. An ordinary node derives its coordinates by minimiz-
ing the error between the measured distances and the estimated dis-
tances to the landmarks. GNP uses the Simplex Downhill method
to compute node coordinates.
Lighthouse [7] is an extension of GNP that is intended to be
more scalable. Although it has a special set of landmark nodes,
a Lighthouse node that joins, does not have to query those global
landmarks. Instead, it can query any existing set of nodes to find
its coordinates relative to that set, and then transform those coordi-
nates into coordinates relative to the global landmarks.
The Network Positioning System (NPS) [8] builds a hierarchical
coordinate system based on GNP, where all nodes could serve as
landmarks (Reference points) for other nodes.
2.2 Decentralized Internet coordinate systems
Practical Internet Coordinates (PIC) [10] is one of the recent de-
centralized coordinate systems using the Simplex Downhill to min-
imize an objective distance error function (sum of relative errors).
It does not require explicitly designated landmarks. It uses an ac-
tive node discovery protocol to find a set of nearby nodes to use to
compute coordinates. Different strategies such as random nodes,
closest nodes, and a hybrid of both, are proposed. PIC aims to
defend the security of its coordinate system against independent
malicious participants using a test based on the triangle inequality.
However, [11] and [13] indicate that network RTTs commonly and
persistently violate the triangle inequality. A security mechanism
based on the fact that the triangle inequality systematically holds,
may lead to degradation of the system performance when no mali-
cious node is inside.
Vivaldi [14] is based on a simulation of springs, where the posi-
tion of the nodes that minimizes the potential energy of the springs
also minimizes the embedding error. Vivaldi defends against high-
error nodes, but not malicious nodes. Finally, Big-Bang Simulation
(BBS) [15] performs a similar simulation to calculate coordinates,
simulating an explosion of particles under a force field.
3. NETWORK POSITIONING SYSTEMS IN
OUR STUDY
In this paper, we chose to concentrate on two systems: NPS as
a representative of the landmark-based approach; and Vivaldi as a
representative of the decentralized approach.
3.1 NPS
NPS is a hierarchical design of the centralized system GNP. It
aims to recover “gracefully” from either landmark failures, or situ-
ations where these special entities of the system and their network
access links become performance bottlenecks. Instead of sending
measurements to a central node that runs the Simplex algorithm
to determine landmark coordinates (as GNP does), each NPS node
runs the error minimization itself each time it measures its distance
latency to landmarks, also called reference point. The main depar-
ture from GNP is that any node that has determined its position can
be chosen by a membership server to be a reference point for other
nodes. Actually, the membership server randomly chooses eligible
nodes to become reference points when the permanent landmarks
are too heavily loaded or unavailable. However, to ensure con-
sistency, NPS imposes a hierarchical position dependency among
the nodes. In the top layer of the system, denoted layer-0 (orL0),
the permanent landmarks are the fixed infrastructure used to define
the bases of the Euclidean space model and can serve as reference
points for the nodes in lower layers (i.e.L1, L2, etc).
Given a set of nodes, NPS partitions them into different layers.
A set of 20 landmarks are placed in layer-0, and an 8-dimensional
Euclidean space is used for embedding. Each node in layerLi
randomly picks some nodes in layerLi−1 as its reference points.
The relative error of the distance prediction between a pair of nodes
is defined as:
relative error =
|actual − predicted|
min(actual, predicted)
In [8], authors argue that a 3-layer NPS system is already very
accurate and can support more than 2 billion nodes.
NPS includes a strategy for mitigating the effects of simple ma-
licious attacks. Indeed, malicious nodes could potentially lie about
their positions and/or inflate network distances by holding onto
probe packets. The basic idea is to eliminate a reference point if it
fits poorly in the Euclidean space compared to the other reference
points. Each node, when computing its coordinates, based on dif-
ferent reference points measurements, would reject the reference
that provides a relative error significantly larger than the median
error of all reference nodes. Specifically, assume there areN r fer-
ence pointsRi, at positionsPRi, and the network distances from a
nodeH to thse areDRi. After H computes a positionPHi based
on these reference points, for eachRi, it computes the fitting error
ERi as
|distance(PH ,PRi)−DRi|
DRi
. Then the requesting node,H, de-
cides whether to eliminate the reference point with the largestERi.
The criterion used by NPS is that if (1)maxiERi > 0.01 and (2)
maxiERi > C × mediani(ERi), whereC is a constant, then the
reference point withmaxiERi is filtered (i.e.H tries to replace it
by another reference point for future repositioning).
3.2 Vivaldi
Vivaldi is fully distributed, requiring no fixed network infrastruc-
ture and no distinguished nodes. A new node computes its coordi-
nates after collecting latency information from only a few other
nodes. Basically, Vivaldi places a spring between pairs of nodes
(i, j) with a rest length set to the known (measured) RTT (Lij)
between them. The current length of the spring is considered to
be the distance between the nodes as estimated in the coordinate
space. The potential energy of such a spring is proportional to the
square of the displacement from its rest length: the sum of these
energies over all springs is the error function that Vivaldi nodes try
to minimize.
An identical Vivaldi procedure runs on every node. Each sample
provides information that allows a node to update its coordinates.
The algorithm handles high error nodes by computing weights for
each received sample. Each sample used by a nodei, is based on
measurement to a nodej, its coordinatesxj and the estimated error
reported byj, ej . The relative error of this sample is then computed
as follows:
es = | ‖ xj − xi ‖ − RTTmeasured | / RTTmeasured
The node then computes the sample weight balancing local and
remote error :w = ei/(ei + ej), whereei is the node’s current
(local) error. This sample weight is used to update an adaptive
timestep,δ defining the fraction of the way the node is allowed
to move toward the perfect position for the current sample:δ =
Cc×w, whereCc is a constant fraction< 1. The node then updates
its local coordinates as follows:
xi = xi + δ · (RTTmeasured − ‖ xi − xj ‖) · u(xi − xj)
whereu(xi−xj) is a unit vector giving the direction ofi’s displace-
ment. Finally, it updates its local error asei = es×w+ei×(1−w).
Vivaldi considers a few possible coordinate spaces that might
better capture the underlying structure of the Internet. Coordinates
embedding maps the network distances into different geometric
spaces, for instance 2D, 3D or 5D Euclidean spaces, spherical coor-
dinates, etc. Vivaldi also introduces theH ight model, consisting in
an Euclidean coordinate space augmented with a height vector. The
Euclidean portion models a high-speed Internet core where laten-
cies are proportional to geographic distance, and the height vector
models the time it takes packets to travel the access link from the
node to the core. In [14], authors show that the more dimensions a
Euclidian space has, the more accurate the Vivaldi system is. More-
over, results prove that height vectors perform better than both 2D
and 3D Euclidean coordinates.
4. THREATS AND ATTACKS CLASSIFICA-
TION
We classify attacks and identified threats that malicious nodes
may seek to carry out on positioning coordinate-based systems.
We consider malicious nodes that have access to the same data as
a legitimate user. This means that participants are not completely
trusted entities, or that malicious nodes have the ability to bypass
any authentication mechanisms. Malicious nodes are able to send
misleading information when probed, or send manipulated infor-
mation after receiving a request or affect some metrics observed by
chosen targets. The main classes of attacks on positioning system
behavior are:
1. Disorder: the main goal of this attack is to create chaos as a
form of denial of service (DoS) attack. This results in high
errors in the positioning of nodes, or the non-convergence
of the algorithm. The attack consists only in maximizing
the relative error of nodes in the system, either passively by
not cooperating or falsifying its coordinates or by actively
delaying probes.
2. Isolation: where nodes would be isolated in the coordinate
space. The attack could target a particular node, in order to
convince the victim that it is positioned in an isolated zone
of the network. The final goal of such attack can be, for in-
stance, obliging the victim to connect to an accomplice node
as the closest node in that zone, in order to perform traffic
analysis or packets dropping, man in the middle attacks, etc.
One way a malicious node can conduct this attack is to delay
probes sent by the victim, and to falsify its proper coordi-
nates, so that the victim’s computed coordinates are set to a
value large enough, to be far from other nodes.
3. Repulsion: where a malicious node would convince its vic-
tims that it is positioned far from other participating nodes
in order to reduce its attractiveness, and then, for instance,
alleviate its resource consumption by not cooperating in the
application progress. Ways to perform such attacks are to
make its conditions (performance, position) seem worse than
they actually are. This is accomplished by means of delaying
measurement probes and/or by manipulating the coordinates
transmitted to other nodes or to a set of central entities, such
as landmarks.
4. System Control: This attack is possible on coordinates-based
systems that allow “normal” nodes to be considered as land-
marks, i.e. most of the existing systems except the central-
ized systems. In hierarchical systems for example, such as
NPS, nodes would try to get higher in the hierarchy in order
to fool and influence the maximum number of correct nodes.
The classes of attacks briefly described above can either be car-
ried out by malicious nodes in an independent manner or as a con-
spiracy created by colluding nodes. Collusion is likely in a scenario
where attack propagation happens through the now well tested means
used in today’s DDoS attacks (e.g. worms, etc).
It should be noted that all attacks, be they explicitly aimed at
disrupting the whole system or skew the coordinates of a single
node will often result in some distortion of the coordinate space.
This is because of the possible cooperation between the nodes that
will act as a catalyzer to the propagation of errors to other (non
directly targeted) nodes.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1 Performance Indicators
We use the relative error (defined in section 3) as our main per-
formance indicator. We compute the average relative error over all
nodes to represent the accuracy of the overall system. Since our
focus is on measuring the impact of malicious nodes on the sys-
tem, we also introduce ther lative error ratio(called Ratio), which
is the relative error measured in presence of malicious nodes nor-
malized to the performance of the system without cheats used as
the best case scenario (i.e.rror ratio = error/errorref ). Obvi-
ously, a value for the error ratio above 1 indicates a degradation in
accuracy.
As the worst case scenario, we also compute the relative error of
a coordinate system where nodes choose their coordinates at ran-
dom. In this random scenario, all nodes choose their coordinate
components randomly in the interval[−50000, 50000] (for each
dimension of the coordinate).
5.2 Simulation set up
We used the “King” data set to model Internet latencies based
on real world measurements. This dataset contains the pair-wise
RTTs between 1740 Internet DNS servers collected using the King
method [17]. This was used to generate a topology with 1740 over-
lay nodes, from which we derived various group sizes by picking
nodes at random (unless otherwise stated, in the simulations, the
group consists of all the 1740 nodes). Each scenario was repeated
10 times with the malicious nodes selected at random within the
group. We consider groups with 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% and
75% of malicious nodes. In view of the infection rates of recent
worm epidemics, we believe these values to be realistic, both dur-
ing and for a long time after an outbreak.
For the Vivaldi simulation scenarios, we used the p2psim discrete-
event simulator [16]. Each Vivaldi node has 64 neighbours (i.e.
is attached to 64 springs), 32 of which being chosen to be closer
than 50 ms. The constant fractionCc for the adaptive timestep
(see section 3.2) is set to 0.25. These values are those recom-
mended in [14]. The system is considered to have stabilized when
all relative errors converge to a value varying by at most 0.02 for
10 simulation ticks. We observed that Vivaldi without malicious
nodes always converged within 1800 simulation ticks, which rep-
resents a convergence time of over 8 hours (1 tick is roughly 17
seconds). Unless otherwise stated, our results are obtained for a
2-dimensional coordinate space.
For NPS, we developed our own event-driven network simula-
tor, based on the description of the protocol in [8] and a reference
implementation of the protocol1. Unless otherwise stated, as rec-
ommended in [8], we considered an 8-dimensional Euclidean space
for the embedding. In layer-0, a set of 20 well separated permanent
Landmarks are chosen. 20% of nodes are randomly chosen as refer-
ence points, in each subsequent layer. For the security mechanism
of NPS, the sensitivity constantC was set to 4.
Finally, in this paper, we consider all the attacks in an “injection”
context, where the malicious nodes are introduced in a system that
has already converged. This is in contrast with a “genesis” attack
where the malicious nodes are present from the system’s creation
time (which we studied in [9] for Vivaldi). The former is more
realistic in a practical setting, and reflects the emergence of threats
carried out by malware in the current Internet.
5.3 Attacks on Vivaldi
5.3.1 Disorder Attack
We first discuss ways to achieve Disorder attacks in Vivaldi. As
it is a fully-distributed algorithm relying on cooperation of nodes
in order to ensure accuracy of the computed coordinates, it seems
easy to fool honest nodes. The disorder attack has no specific ob-
jective, but false coordinates computations and high positioning er-
ror. When solicited, a malicious node sends a randomly selected
coordinatexj , associated with a very low error,ej = 0.01. More-
over, each node’s measurement is delayed by a randomly generated
value in [100..1000] ms. In this first scenario, it is not necessary to
care about lie consistency, as Vivaldi uses error weights sent along
with the responses to probes to adjust the adaptive timestep. Even
if the measured distanceRTTmeasured to malicious nodej is not
consistent with the coordinatesxj , the victimi would consider it-
self as a high error node, and would try to adjust its coordinates by
a great adaptive timestep value, due to the fact thatj sends a low
error.
Figure 1 depicts the relative error ratio variation in function of
time, for our full set of 1740 nodes, representative of the impact of
the malicious nodes on the system. It is clear that enough attackers
can quickly destabilize a converged system and seriously reduce
the system accuracy. It is interesting to note that, in the presence
of enough malicious nodes, despite the system converging in the
sense that the relative errors at each node stabilize, these errors are
so high that a great variation of the coordinates of a node barely
affects the associated error. In other words, the coordinates of the
nodes keep showing great variations and do not stabilize but the
error introduced by such constant movement is stable because there
is already so much chaos in the system. In essence, the system is
deemed to converge because it doesn’t get any better nor any worse.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of the relative error of
the victims of an injected disorder attack. We clearly see that from
30% of malicious nodes the impact on the system can be considered
1The authors would like to thank Prof. Eugene Ng for sharing his
code.
as very serious with many nodes seeing a large increase in their
relative errors. For a proportion of 50% or more malicious nodes,
the system collapses with over half of the honest nodes computing
coordinates that are similar or worse than if chosen randomly.
Figure 1: Injection of Disorder Attackers on Vivaldi: average
relative error ratio.
Figure 2: Injected Disorder attack on Vivaldi: CDF of relative
error at simulation tick = 5000
Figure 3 represents the impact of the space dimension on the at-
tack. In this figure, the average relative error of honest nodes is
measured after re-convergence. We see that the more accurate the
Vivaldi system is in the absence of malicious nodes, the more vul-
nerable it is to the disorder attack. This is because the variation of
more coordinates components for a point in a larger space results in
higher displacement in that space. This observation is compounded
for the 2-dimensional space augmented by a height as a variation
of the height yields a greater effect on the node displacement. We
also observe that in most cases, Vivaldi with half the population of
malicious nodes is worse than a random coordinate system.
Figure 4 shows the impact of the attack as a function of the sys-
tem size as measured a long time after the attack started. We see
that a larger system is more difficult to impact for a same propor-
tion of attackers. This is consistent with the fact that a larger Vivaldi
system is more accurate, but also establishes that Vivaldi finds in-
creased strength in a larger group. Put simply, this is because as one
increases the number of springs in the system, the energy needed to
disrupt it is higher. In our case, a larger group means more “good”
forces to counteract and dissipate the effect of the malicious ones.
5.3.2 Repulsion Attack
In this scenario, malicious nodes are trying to isolate some nodes
in the network, either by repulsing a set of targets away from other
Figure 3: Injected Disorder Attack on Vivaldi: Impact of space
dimensions
Figure 4: Injection of Disorder Attackers on Vivaldi: Impact
of system size on the attack.
nodes in the coordinate space, or by repulsing all requesting nodes
away from a selected target. The first attack consists in fixing co-
ordinates where to isolate all requesting nodes, sayXtarget. It is
important to notice that this value is set high enough to allow lie
consistency. This means that the predicted distance after the lie
should be equal to the measured distance. In fact, since we assume
that a malicious node cannot shorten a distance measurement, but
can however delay it, we must set the coordinates of both the victim
and the malicious node to be consistent with this fact. Although for
most network positioning systems, application probes are used, for
generality purposes we design and test the attacks assuming ICMP
ping probes. We assume here that malicious nodes know the cur-
rent coordinates of their targets,XCurrent, by means of previous
requests for example. Malicious nodes are then able to compute the
neededRTT that are consistent with the lie,
RTT = (‖ Xtarget−XCurrent ‖ /δ)+ ‖ Xtarget−XCurrent ‖
and to delay the measuredRTT by:
RTTneeded − 2 · (ReceivedT imestamp − SendT imestamp).
Each malicious node is selecting a random coordinate that is far
away from the origin.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution function of the mea-
sured average relative error after convergence in an repulsion at-
tack. The gentler slope of the curves indicates that the impact of
this type of attack is greater than in the case of a disorder attack
(see fig. 2). This is because a repulsion attack is more structured
and more consistent than a disorder attack, since the chosen target
coordinate is always the same for every victim-attacker pair.
We study the effect of space dimension on the attack in figure 6.
Figure 5: Injected Repulsion Attack on Vivaldi: CDF of rela-
tive error.
Again, the results confirm that the more accurate the system is with-
out malicious nodes, the more vulnerable it is to attacks, which
highlights a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and vulnera-
bility.
Figure 6: Injected Repulsion Attack on Vivaldi: impact of
space dimensions.
So far, the repulsion attack consisted in each attacker attacking
every other node. Figure 7 shows the effect of a modified repul-
sion attack where each attacker independently attacks a subset of
the other nodes. Each attacker chooses its own target subset inde-
pendently, along with their target coordinate values. However, the
target subset size is fixed and equal for all attackers. We see that
small subsets chosen independently result in a less effective attack
and that there is no great difference in effectiveness when the set of
attackers constitutes less than 30% the population. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that in such conditions the attack gets “diluted”,
giving the system plenty of opportunity to correct itself through
nodes that are under no, or very little, attack.
Figure 8 shows the response of a system under injection repul-
sion attack as a function of system size. As in the case of a disorder
attack, larger systems reduce the impact of the attack. However,
because a repulsion attack is much more consistent than a disorder
attack, the system is less effective at countering the effects. This is
why we observe higher values for the average relative error and a
much gentler slope of the curve than in figure 4.
5.3.3 Colluding Isolation attack
This is a repulsion attack where the attackers behave consistently
in a collective way. They could, for instance, try and move all hon-
est nodes consistently away from a same designated target node.
That is, they agree on a distance from the chosen node for each vic-
Figure 7: Injected Repulsion Attack on subsets of target nodes.
Figure 8: Injection Repulsion Attack on Vivaldi: effect of sys-
tem size
tim and collectively and consistently direct victims towards their
designated coordinate.
Figure 9 depicts the effects of a colluding isolation attack on
the system. The salient result is that the system can quickly be-
come worse than a random coordinate system. Indeed, from 30%
of malicious nodes in the system, the accuracy becomes equal or
worse than if nodes chose their coordinates at random. This clearly
demonstrates that colluding attacks are very potent due to their bet-
ter structure and can have a great adverse impact on overall system
performance.
Figure 9: Colluding isolation Attack on Vivaldi: average rela-
tive error ratio
Another type of colluding isolation attack is for the attackers to
set their coordinates in a remote area of the coordinate space (so
that they are clustered in that area) and then to choose a victim
target node and convince it that its own coordinate is within the
attacker cluster. The target coordinate is set before the attack begins
and agreed by all attackers.
We observe in figure 10 the variation of the relative error of the
Figure 10: Colluding Isolation attack on Vivaldi: target relative
error
target through time. We see that the first type of colluding isolation
attack (consisting in repelling all other honest nodes from a chosen
target) is more effective than trying to lure a target into a remote
area of the space. Intuitively, this is because much more error is
introduced in the system when more nodes are pushed away from
their correct position, thus resulting in more distortion of the coor-
dinate space with greater repercussion on the final position of the
target nodes. This is indeed confirmed by the results of figure 11
that depicts the cumulative relative error for the nodes in the system
under both types of colluding attacks.
Figure 11: Colluding Isolation Attack on Vivaldi: CDF of rela-
tive errors.
5.3.4 Combined attacks
In the context of system offering an always-on and large scale
coordinate service, it is plausible to assume a constant and per-
manent low level at malicious nodes. Indeed, in the previous sec-
tions we have examined the effects of attack outbreaks. But in the
wild, as has already been observed after major worm outbreaks and
security warnings, once an outbreak has been contained and re-
solved, one can expect that some small portion of the systems are
not upgraded for a very long time after the release of the necessary
patches. This is especially true in the case of systems that are un-
der many different administrative controls (as is the case for home
personal computers). Figure 12 shows the impact of such low level
of combined attacks on Vivaldi, where colluding nodes implement
strategy 1 of the colluding isolation attack. In these combined at-
tacks, the percentage of malicious nodes of each type is the same.
This figure shows that fairly low level of malicious nodes can still
have a sizeable impact on the overall system performance, which,
in turn, indicates that return to normality after an attack may take
an extremely long time, if at all possible.
Figure 12: Combining attacks on Vivaldi: impact on conver-
gence.
Finally, figure 13 confirms that larger systems are more resilient
and recover better than smaller ones.
Figure 13: Combined attacks on Vivaldi: effect of system size.
5.4 Attacks on NPS
We experimented the NPS system in both a secure and non se-
cure version. Unless stated otherwise, the security mechanism is set
on. Note also that we consider the ideal, hypothetical case where
the landmarks are highly secure machines that never cheat. The
results we present in the following sections can therefore be con-
sidered as best case scenarios from a security point-of-view, as the
impact of attacks could be much more severe should our security
of landmark hypothesis not hold.
5.4.1 Injection of independent Disorder attackers
In this first attack, when malicious nodes are chosen as refer-
ence points by the membership server (or when an already active
reference point gets infected by malware), they perform simple at-
tack that consists in transmitting the correct coordinates of the (ma-
licious) reference point to the victim, and delaying measurement
probes without caring about lie consistency. Figure 14 depicts the
average relative error variation in function of time, while injecting
after convergence of the system, a percentage of malicious nodes.
When the malicious reference node detection mechanism is off, we
Figure 14: Injection of Independent Disorder attackers (No
prevention): average relative error.
notice the sharp climb in relative error when 20% of malicious
nodes join the system. The accuracy of NPS is destroyed when
cheating nodes get introduced in layer 1 of the measurement hier-
archy. On the other hand, the malicious reference node detection
mechanism is shown to be highly effective in combating such a
malicious population of up to more than 30% of the overall pop-
ulation. However, a population of 40% or more malicious nodes
in the system defeats the NPS security mechanism. This can be
explained by the fact that the security mechanism relies on simple
statistical properties of the observed errors (i.e the median) to filter
out perceived outliers. In the presence of enough malicious nodes
serving as reference points, the computation of the median itself
gets skewed sufficiently that malicious behaviour is assimilated to
normal behaviour. The cumulative distribution function of the mea-
sured average relative error shown in figure 15 confirms previous
results. The gentler slope, and heavy tail feature, of the 40% and
50% curves when security is on indicates the impact of the attack
when enough malicious nodes are introduced in the system. We
observe that when introducing 40% of malicious nodes, only 50%
of honest nodes would re-converge to a relative error less than 0.5.
Figure 15: Injection of Independent Disorder attackers: CDF.
Figure 16 shows the effect of space dimension when NPS is sub-
jected to a simple disorder attack. Just as in the Vivaldi case, this
experiment proves again that the more accurate the system is with-
out malicious nodes, the more vulnerable to attacks it is. In partic-
ular, we observe that with more dimensions used in the coordinate
space, the NPS system is much more vulnerable to a smaller portion
of malicious nodes. We observe that systems running with 6 and 8
dimensions still can prevent against a minority of malicious nodes,
whereas a simple attack can destabilize a 10 or 12-dimensions NPS
Figure 16: Injection of Independent Disorder attackers: Im-
pact of dimensionality.
system more easily. In the later cases, when malicious nodes only
constitute 20% of the population, the relative error climbs to more
than 1. From 50% of malicious nodes injected in the system, the
accuracy becomes equal or worse than if nodes chose their coordi-
nates at random. This is explained by the fact that the more dimen-
sions are used, the more ”chances” malicious nodes get to become
reference nodes, creating greater confusion among the honest nodes
that depend on them in the layers below. Moreover, as in the Vivaldi
case, more dimensions result in greater displacement in coordinates
space for the victim.
5.4.2 Injection of Anti-Detection Naive Disorder At-
tackers
In this section, we consider an attack whose primary strategy is
to try and defeat the NPS security mechanism. To this end, at-
tackers will lie consistently about their position and inflate network
distances by that corresponding amount, while paying particular at-
tention that the relative error computed by the victim is lower than
0.01. Doing so essentially negates the very first condition checked
to detect malicious nodes (see section 3.1), in effect shutting down
detection of the attackers.
First, we consider that malicious nodes know their targets’ co-
ordinates with a probabilityp = 1/2. We discuss next the effect
of coordinates information on the efficiency of the attack. The tar-
get coordinates information allows first to better estimate the dis-
tance between the target and the attacker and second to compute
the direction defined in the coordinate space by the nodes them-
selves. When not available, the malicious node sets a random di-
rection and estimates the distance between itself and the target as
ReceivedT imestamp − SendT imestamp.
As illustrated in figure 17, the attack consists in delaying the
victims’ probes by‖ P ′Ri−PRi ‖= d
′ such that‖ P ′Ri−PRi ‖≫ d
and then send coordinatesP ′′Ri such that
‖ P ′′Ri − PRi ‖< 0.01 ‖ P
′
Ri − PRi ‖.
Figure 17: Anti-Detection NPS attack
It is easily shown thatERi < 0.01 ⇒ d′′ > α+1.990.01 · d with
α d = d′′ − d′.
To make the attack harder and make the security mechanism of
NPS behave in more realistic way, we add a probe threshold con-
dition to each probe, such that a probe would be considered by the
requesting node as suspicious if the RTT it measured was above
that threshold. Such probes are then discarded. In the following
simulations, the probe threshold is set to 5 seconds. In a first sce-
nario, we consider malicious nodes that ignore this probe threshold,
yielding a so-called naive anti-detection disorder attack.
In figure 18, we observe the average relative error variation af-
ter injection of malicious nodes in a converged NPS system. We
see that this attack has a bigger impact on the whole system than
the simple disorder attack (see figure 14), causing greater average
relative errors. We also observe that the attack is very effective at
defeating the security mechanism, with the security-protected rel-
ative errors only trailing marginally the errors observed when no
security mechanism but the probe threshold is employed. This is
despite the attacker guessing half of the time and could therefore
appear surprising. However, the reader should note that the NPS
security mechanism discards at most one malicious reference point
at each positioning (i.e. the one yielding the greater error), giving
the malicious nodes potentially several reprieves on bad guesses.
Figure 18: Injection in NPS of Anti-detection naive attackers:
impact on convergence.
As for the Vivaldi system, we note that in presence of only a
minority of malicious nodes, despite the system converging in the
sense that the relative errors at each node stabilize, these errors are
so high that a great variation of the coordinates does not affect the
associated error.
We measured the impact of dimensionality and group size on
the effectiveness of this attack and found the now expected results
that higher precision (i.e. higher dimensionality) was more affected
while larger groups present a better immunity.
More interesting in this attack is the effect the knowledge of the
attacker has on its effectiveness. In figure 19, we show the rela-
tive error ratio for various probabilities that the attacker knows a
victims’s coordinates prior to striking. We see that in the presence
of a small malicious population, full knowledge of victims’ coor-
dinate can almost triple the effectiveness of the attack compared
to the pure guess work case. However, as the population of mali-
cious nodes grows, the benefits of more knowledge diminish. This
confirms again that, regardless of the sophistication of the attack,
the NPS security system soon gets overwhelmed when the popula-
tion of malicious node exhibits a certain critical mass. As figure 20
shows by representing the ratio of malicious nodes filtered to the
overall number of filtered nodes by the security mechanism, this
critical mass is about 20% (about half the needed population of ma-
licious node compared to the simple disorder attack). Furthermore,
this figure also confirms that, as more and more malicious nodes are
able to operate in all impunity, the errors they introduce in the posi-
tioning of honest nodes result in higher false positive rates with the
security mechanism filtering out more and more (mis-positioned)
honest reference points. But because at most one reference point
gets filtered per positioning, these false positives actually create
some extra protection for the malicious ones.
Figure 19: Injection in NPS of Anti-detection naive attackers:
effect of victims coordinates knowledge.
Figure 20: Injection in NPS of Anti-detection naive attackers:
effect of victims coordinates knowledge on the ratio of filtered
malicious nodes over the overall filtered nodes.
5.4.3 Injection of Anti-Detection Sophisticated Dis-
order Attackers
We now present a modification of the previous attack where the
malicious nodes make an attempt to not only defeat the NPS mech-
anism but also avoid detection by the probe threshold mechanism.
To do so, an attacker will only interfere with the positioning pro-
cess of nodes known, or believed, to be nearby. Indeed, if we recall
the discussion in section 5.4.2, with a probe threshold of 5 s and
α = 2, thend′′ + d < 5s ⇒ d < 25ms in order to avoid detection
by the NPS security system,d being the real distance between an
attacker and its victim. As this attack is bound to be less detectable
by the security mechanisms than the previous one which already
yielded small differences between the ”security on” and ”security
off” cases, only results in the presence of these security mecha-
nisms are presented here. Unless stated otherwise, the attackers
guess the position of their victims half of the time.
Figure 21 shows the cumulative distribution function of the rel-
ative errors in a system under anti-detection sophisticated disorder
attack. Clearly, this attack is devastating on the overall accuracy
of the coordinate system, despite the attackers being more selec-
tive of their victims. This is because, even though the errors in-
troduced by each attacker are smaller than in the naive case (nodes
that are closer can only be ”pushed” less aggressively if the attacker
is to avoid detection), these errors are allowed to permeate unchal-
lenged through the system, propagating more widely through the
undetected mis-positioning of honest nodes. We observed that in
the system without malicious nodes, the mean relative error con-
verged towards a value of about 0.4. Here we see that as little as
10% of attackers leave over 60% of the overall population worse
off than the average node in a clean system. We also observed that
compared with the more naive version of this attack (figure 18), the
more sophisticated version induces higher average errors.
Again, better accuracy (i.e. higher dimensionality) and smaller
group sizes were observed to be more sensitive to the attack.
Figure 21: Injected Anti-detection Sophisticated attacks on
NPS: CDF.
Figure 22 shows the impact of the attacker’s knowledge on the
attack. By going from pure guessing to full knowledge (i.e. at-
tacking only victims whose coordinate are known), an attacker can
reduce by half its chances of being caught. We also see that the
intrinsically more cautious strategy of this attack dramatically re-
duces the chances of an attacker being detected compared with the
naive attack case (figure 20), especially when malicious nodes rep-
resent a smaller proportion of the population and operate without
much exact coordinate knowledge of their victims. Indeed, for the
case where the attacker never knows exactly the coordinate of their
victims, figure 22 shows that over 75% of all detections are false
positives for attackers populations of 10% and over of the group.
Figure 22: Injected Anti-detection Sophisticated attacks on
NPS: effect of victims coordinates knowledge on the ratio of
filtered malicious nodes over the overall filtered nodes.
5.4.4 Injection of Colluding Isolation attackers
In a colluding isolation attacks, the malicious nodes cooperate
with each other and behave in a correct and honest way until enough
of them become reference points at the same layer. Once at least a
minimum number of malicious reference points has been reached
(in our simulation this number is set to 5), these attackers identify
a common set of victims. When involved in the positioning of any
other nodes, the attackers do not cheat; while when dealing with a
target node, they agree to pretend they are all clustered into a re-
mote (far away) part of the coordinate space and carry out a naive
anti-detection attack on the victim. The goal of this attack is to
push the victims into a remote location at the ”opposite” of where
the attackers pretend to be, thus isolation the victims from all the
other nodes (in the coordinate space). The other main idea behind
this attack is that by acting in a consistent way as a group, the at-
tackers can maybe avoid detection by influencing the value of the
median relative error (condition 2 of the NPS security mechanism –
see 3.1). Also, as already mentioned, even if detected, at most one
attackers would be filtered at each positioning, giving the others
more opportunities to act.
We consider 2 scenarios for this attack. The first scenario con-
sists in experimenting with a 3-layer NPS system, i.e. a system with
the landmarks in layer-0, 20% of nodes serving as reference points
in layer 1, and the rest of the nodes in layer-2. The second scenario
is aimed at observing the propagation of errors through different
layers and uses a 4-layer NPS system, with 2 layers (layer-1 and
layer-2) containing 20% of the nodes acting as reference points.
Figures 23 and 24 show the cumulative distribution function of
the relative errors in a 3-layer and 4-layer NPS system (respec-
tively) under this colluding isolation attack. We observe a striking
difference of impact depending on the structure of the NPS system.
Indeed, the overall accuracy of a 3-layer system is much less unaf-
fected than the accuracy of a 4-layer system. On the one hand, it
is worth remembering that, in the 3-layer system, non victim nodes
do not see any degradation of the accuracy of their positions (com-
pared to a clean system), because they observe an honest behaviour
from the attackers. This means that the overall degradation in ac-
curacy is caused by the mis-positioning of the victims only. Hence,
the perceived little impact of the attack depicted in figure 23 actu-
ally tends to indicates that the attack is very effective on the victim.
On the other hand, in a 4-layer system, some of the victims may
be unwittingly selected by the membership server to act as layer-
2 reference points. The position errors inflicted on these nodes is
then propagated through the rest of the system, resulting is an am-
plification of the errors from layer to layer. This is demonstrated
in figure 25 that shows the average relative error of layer-2 and
layer-3 nodes in clean 3-layer and 4-layer systems respectively, as
well as the average relative error observed by layer-2 targets and
layer-3 nodes in corrupted systems with a population of 20% of
malicious nodes. From this figure, it is clear that the impact of
layer-1 cheats on layer-2 victims is independent of the system struc-
ture (the curves are similar), layer-3 nodes of an attacked 4-layer
system experience the worse mis-position. This propagation and
amplification of the errors in this 4-layer system can be seen as a
system-control attack (see 4).
Finally, as in the Vivaldi case, we measured the impact of several
small population of attackers which concurrently carry out all the
previous attacks. This is reminiscent of a situation where some
nodes are still misbehaving for some time following the release of
patches and updates after a major outbreak of malware. Again, we
see that attacks can have long lasting consequences on the operation
of the coordinate system.
Figure 23: Injection of colluding Isolation attack on NPS in
scenario 1: CDF of relative errors.
Figure 24: Injection of colluding Isolation attack on NPS in
scenario 2: CDF of relative errors.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied various types of attacks on two
prominent coordinate system proposals. One of our salient findings
is that larger systems are consistently more resilient than smaller
ones. Given the observation in [14] and [8] that larger systems
are more accurate and the well known fact that larger systems con-
verge slower at start-up time, there seems to be a compelling case
for large-scale coordinate systems to be built as a virtual infrastruc-
ture service component. The paradox is of course that always-on,
large scale systems supporting many different applications will al-
ways attract more attacks than systems with a smaller reach, while
the large size of the system itself would act as a particularly good
terrain to create especially virulent propagation of the attack.
Our results also show that there is an intrinsic trade-off to be
made between accuracy and vulnerability. Indeed, we have shown
that the more accurate the system for a given system size, the more
susceptible it was to a same proportionate level of attack.
Also, we have shown that while an attack is in full swing, the
performance of the coordinate systems (and of the applications it
supports) can easily degrade below that of a system where coordi-
nates are chosen randomly, whilst the aftermath of an attack could
have very long lasting effects on the system due to a small number
of remaining malicious nodes.
We have also shown that infrastructure-based systems can, un-
der some well chosen attack strategies, be as vulnerable than those
based on the peer-to-peer paradigm. Furthermore, the security mech-
anisms that have been proposed to date to defend against malicious
nodes are clearly rather primitive and still in their infancy and def-
Figure 25: Injection of colluding Isolation attack on NPS: Prop-
agation of errors.
Figure 26: Injection of combined attacks on NPS (Independent
disorder, Anti-Detection Sophisticated disorder and colluding
isolation attackers): Impact on convergence.
initely cannot defend against all types of attacks.
In our future work, we will concentrate on designing generic de-
fense and security mechanisms to protect coordinate-based systems
from large-scale malicious attacks. This work will be guided by the
understanding of attack mechanisms and of their consequences on
the coordinate systems gained from the study presented in this pa-
per.
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